

# CDRC DIGEST

A monthly publication of the Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC)

M A Y 2 0 1 7

Vol. 2 No. 6

## TOPIC:

### Articles

- Resolving the stalemate in Sudan-South Sudan relations: Unpacking the latest round of efforts.....1
- Developments in Somalia and the challenges ahead.....6

### Events

- CDRC monthly seminar hosts Dr. Walid Mussa.....12
- Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin addresses the International Berlin Gathering.....14



CDRC is a non-profit, independent Ethiopia-based policy institute engaged in research and analysis. The Centre looks at opportunities and key challenges in the Horn of Africa, and focuses on policy ideas on development, sustainable peace and security.

The CDRC Digest is the Centre's monthly publication, endeavoring to provide an African perspective on political, economic and social developments as well as mechanisms of sustaining peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the African continent and beyond. The publication is based on dialogue, rigorous research and analysis.

Executive Director: Dr. Abdeta Dribssa Beyene  
Deputy Executive Director: Amb. Kasahun Dender  
Senior Adviser: Amb. Teferra Shiawl Kidanekal  
Senior Researcher: Dr. Belete Belachew Yihun  
Editor: Fiona McKinnon

Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation  
Ethio-China Friendship Avenue  
Medina Tower 5th floor  
Tel: +251 11 470 0370/73  
Fax: +251 11 470 0359  
Email: [info@cdrcethiopia.org](mailto:info@cdrcethiopia.org)  
<http://www.cdrcethiopia.org>

## **Resolving the stalemate in Sudan-South Sudan relations: Unpacking the latest round of efforts**

Sudan and South Sudan have not made progress in comprehensively addressing their outstanding issues, particularly the issue of Abyei. But the recent Security Council discussion on the matter has prompted the parties to reassemble to address this. After a one-year lull, the Joint Political and Security Committee of the Sudan and South Sudan was forced to hold an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa, and the UN Security Council likewise passed a very demanding resolution. As has so often been the case, Abyei and the common border have taken center stage in the latest effort to resolve the political impasse between the two countries. The Addis Ababa extraordinary meeting was the result of a meeting at the UN Security Council, which expressed its resolve to take measures concurrent with making the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) cost-effective and efficient, or else force it to withdraw if the Parties fail to make serious progress. Political tensions have long revolved around, among other issues, ownership of the contested border town of Abyei, and complexities surrounding the failed attempt to conduct the Abyei referendum on the basis of the Abyei protocol and the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Rather than

implementing the agreements in earnest, the parties were involved in rallying their respective constituencies to influence proceedings. By doing this, the belligerent parties jeopardized the prospects for peace and security along their common border, and on a grand scale squandered the chance for mutually beneficial rapprochement. The subsequent militarization of the common boundary ultimately precipitated the deployment of UNISFA, as well as the initiative to create a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). Even then, the two countries remained resistant and antagonistic, and their behavior compromised the smooth functioning of the UN-sponsored agencies on the ground. The resultant frustration in turn triggered a reaction from the UN Security Council, whereby the penholder began requesting a change of configuration within UNISFA. The whole situation rekindled one of the latest rounds of debates in the UNSC, between advocates of the idea of reversing/rescaling financial and military engagements and those intent on giving negotiated settlement another chance, with all of the time and support this requires. What emerges clearly out of this nexus is the fact that the international community's patience is fast dwindling. As a result of this pressure, the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the two belligerent

parties conducted a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14-15 May 2017.

Khartoum and Juba have not made serious progress since the 14 October 2015 extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa, which ultimately resulted in the creation of a Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM). Now crippling economic realities and the resultant political upheavals locally have finally forced both governments back to the negotiating table. South Sudan, in particular, has borne the brunt of the downward spiral as a result of the grave state of affairs internally, as well as to the north; but Sudan has been forced to live with the consequences of its economic and political policies towards the world's newest country too. Both governments have found themselves in a progressively worsening financial crisis, with socio-political turmoil at home and external marginalization. It has required this combination of economic woes, international pressure, and the exigencies of self-preservation to convince them to reconsider their belligerent positions towards each other.

After 2015, following ordinary sessions of the JPSM, resolving the border dispute became the primary focus, with the supposedly oil-rich and highly contested Abyei region top of the agenda. Even though the two sides institutionalized the SDBZ and JBVM and introduced the concept of 'border

crossing corridors,' still outward commitment to overseeing the activation and implementation of these initiatives has yet to materialize on the ground. Even the latest extraordinary session of the JPSM in Addis Ababa, held on 14-15 May 2017 and conducted under the facilitation of the Africa Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP), emphasized these shortcomings.

A report from UNISFA on the status of the SDBZ and JBVM, presented to the extraordinary session, for example, highlights the detrimental role of challenges like "poor infrastructure along the SDBZ, non-establishment of the team-sites, slow bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining approval and permission for aerial monitoring missions and the fact that ground monitoring missions had not commenced" in the execution of the joint initiatives.

A detailed operational plan was forwarded and endorsed at the conclusion of the latest JPSM extraordinary session, with an equally detailed outline of the roles and responsibilities of the two governments. This new plan calls for "initiating ground-monitoring missions, improving the efficiency of the aerial monitoring missions, establishment of four team-sites, activation of four border crossing points, and invit[ing] the AU Border

Program-Technical Team (AUBP-TT) to mark the coordinates of the border crossing points." Of course, representatives of the two parties to the extraordinary meeting, Gen. Imad-Eddin Mustafa Adawi, SAF Chief of Joint Staff, and Gen. James Ajongo Mawut, the newly appointed SPLA Chief of General Staff, underscored "the slow implementation of previous decisions," and more importantly "stressed the centrality of the JBVMM for peace and security" of their respective countries. Cognizant of the detrimental effects on stability along the common border and beyond, the two delegations resolved to speed up the activation of the JBVMM. In this regard they committed to establish four team sites along the joint border by September 2017, to ensure freedom of movement for all JBVMM personnel, to immediately commence ground monitoring missions, to authorize the use of the heli-pad in Gok-Machar localities, to accelerate the process of approvals for aerial monitoring missions and to grant landing clearance for aerial monitoring missions, "effective immediately within the SDBZ."

To what extent the parties involved are ready to facilitate the tasks of UNISFA remains to be seen. Practically speaking, this time around, Sudan and South Sudan have little maneuvering room other than outward commitment to the "smooth and full implementation" of all

of the JPSM's decisions, particularly those passed on 5 June 2016 and the recommendations of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) of 30 September 2016. As per these decisions, the two parties are expected to remove all obstacles identified by UNISFA. Urgent among them is the removal of all armed personnel from north and south of the SDBZ, which has to be finalized by mid-June 2017, just before a scheduled JSC meeting in Khartoum. The two Chiefs of Staff were also tasked with forming an ad hoc committee on the 14 Mile Area within three weeks of the signing of these decisions, i.e., 15 May 2017. The Addis Ababa meeting of 15 May actually set a stringent timetable with the objective of generating actionable commitment from the two sides. JPSM is now expected to convene in late June or early July in Juba, whereupon it will compile a report on the implementation of these decisions for the AUHIP. If the JPSM fails to meet by the designated date, then the AUHIP has been authorized to hold an extraordinary meeting of the JPSM. Apparently, the noose is tightening on Khartoum and Juba, and they should make progress in the coming months. Otherwise there will be consequences to their inaction.

The recent meeting at the Security Council, which ultimately passed a resolution to extend the mandate of UNISFA by six months, witnessed its fair share of commotion. A difficult

negotiation had ensued following the circulation of an initial draft by the United States, the penholder on the question of the Sudan and South Sudan including Abyei. The draft resolution requested Council Members to extend the mandate of UNISFA, which would expire on 15 May 2017, for an additional six months, but with a proposal that immediately terminates the mission's role in supporting the JBVMM and, consequently, a reduction in the UNISFA troop ceiling from 5,329 to 4,170.

Accordingly there were clear arguments for and reservations expressed about the need to sustain UNISFA as is, but at the same time encourage and put pressure on the parties to make progress on the ground.

Even if this was the case, the first draft resolution was put under the silence procedure, despite most Council Members objecting to the proposed changes to the mandate of UNISFA. Considering the implications of the decision for UNISFA, and as the sole contributor of the UNISFA forces, Ethiopia broke the silence and forwarded another proposal, in line with the recommendations of the Secretary-General's special report reviewing the mandate of UNISFA, released on 5 April 2017. This proposal requested maintenance of the JBVMM at its interim operating capacity, while agreeing to a reduction in the UNISFA troop ceiling to

4791. This would mean that the vacant numbers in the JBVMM ceiling would be eliminated.

Although this was a fair proposal, there was an insistence that the initial draft be put forward for adoption on 12 May 2017, even if the necessary votes were not secured. Most members of the Security Council were also reasonable in understanding the fact that both the Sudan and South Sudan have failed to deliver on the matter and hence need to be forewarned of the consequences of failure to progress beyond the status quo. The Council members were also aware of the rationale behind Ethiopia's counter-proposal. And there was general recognition of the implications of readjusting the configuration of the forces and their equipment, which might jeopardize UNISFA's work on the ground.

This recognition and the lack of sufficient support for the initial proposal provided an opportunity for two members of the Council to take the initiative to request that consultations be held at the Permanent Representatives level before voting on the initial draft, in order to avoid unnecessary division within the Council.

In the ensuing constructive consultations and negotiations conducted at various levels, the Council finally reached agreement on a consensual proposal that would decide

on a final extension of the mandate of UNISFA with regards to the JBVMM. The Council called on both parties to demonstrate clear commitment to implementation of the JBVMM through their actions, thereby reducing the authorized troop ceiling to 4,791.

In passing Resolution 2352 (2017), the UNSC also warned the belligerent parties that they must sort out their problems immediately, as the mandate of UNISFA was only extended by six months, effective until 15 November 2017. UNISFA's extended mandate includes supporting the activities of JBVMM in the disputed territory. But the latest resolution also underscores the point that this support will be withdrawn if the two countries fail to comply with their obligations.

The resolution presses upon Sudan and South Sudan "to resume direct negotiations in order to agree on a final settlement of the Abyei question." Cognizant of the delays and hindrances in the operations of the JBVMM, as per the requirements of UNSC Resolution 2046 (2012) and the African Union Peace and Security Roadmap, the recent resolution also extended UNISFA's mandate to support the JBVMM. But the extension was attached to the condition that it "would be the last unless both parties demonstrated 'clear commitment and steadfast guarantees' of implementation."

Resolution 2352 (2017) was adopted unanimously, but the process leading to its adoption demonstrated a sharp difference of opinion in the Security Council. Divergence of opinion particularly revolved around the major powers, which questioned the applicability of sustaining the status quo, on the one hand, and those projecting hope and positive expectations that Sudan and South Sudan would come around and make critical progress within the specified six-month period. But for the two countries, the whole situation poses a new round of challenges, and given the impatience of the international community, the next few months appear to be critical. Therefore, it is up to the governments in Khartoum and Juba to meet the expectations of the Security Council or be ready for the consequences of their inaction.

In the meantime, it is critical to prepare for any and all eventualities. Unless the parties make concrete progress on the JBVMM over the next six months, it is now possible that UNISFA's mandate will be terminated. If this happens without concrete progress on the ground, there will be serious security challenges for the IGAD region. Although the outcome of the extraordinary meeting of the JPSM convened by the AUHIP in Addis Ababa will hopefully activate JBVMM operations, further progress must be

made to radically reverse the trajectory. Without serious progress on the ground, it will be difficult to ensure ongoing support. The full commitment of the parties to implementing the outcome of the JPSM meeting will be critical in this regard. It is also encouraging to see that the two parties, in a meeting held this week in Addis Ababa, have agreed that the elders of both sides will meet and convene every two months to review the situation. On the other hand, the parties have yet to agree on the establishment of the joint administration for Abyei. As the sole contributor of UNISFA and a country neighboring both the Sudan and South Sudan, with security interlinked with both states and their peaceful relations, Ethiopia will be following these developments closely.

### **Developments in Somalia and the challenges ahead**

The much anticipated London Conference on Somalia took place on 11 May 2017. It was conducted under the co-chairmanship of the UK, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the UN and the AU, and attended by 42 ‘friends and partners’ of Somalia, including the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Its new President and delegates from some Federal Member States (FMS) represented Somalia. CDRC has observed in its April Digest the prospects and challenges Somalia encountered going into the London Conference of 11 May. While

lauding Somali elites’ apparent compromise on stumbling blocks impeding the creation of a united front and on matters related to the security architecture, the Digest also highlighted possible tensions within the Federal Government and those manifesting between the center and the FMS. Although Somalia has made concrete achievements in terms of decentralization and governance at the local level, government institutions remain fragile and the relations between the administrations need to be enhanced further, beyond the politics of alliances and counter alliances. Irrespective of the elite bargaining that has produced a semblance of accord at the national level, targeting the London conference, Somalia’s efforts to create a stable federal arrangement continue to face challenges. This coupled with the recurrent drought, the rampant corruption, and security challenges posed by the likes of Al-Shabaab put the government in a tight position. The London Conference occurred amidst these challenges, which affected the perceptions and expectations of Somali politicians as well as the international community. Somalia’s delegation headed to London with identifiable goals: seeking security guarantees and financial support.

In line with the expectations of Somalia’s leaders, the London Conference prioritized the issue of

Somalia's security in general and Somalia's National Security Architecture in particular. The ongoing drought-related humanitarian crisis also assumed center-stage in the deliberations. The 'tremendous' progress that Somalia has achieved in recent times was emphasized, but it was equally cautioned on the need for guarded optimism. A communiqué issued at the end of the meeting lauded the progress made so far in relation to smooth political transition and affirmed the international community's commitment to maintaining peace and security in the country. In this connection, a Security Pact and a revitalized New Partnership for Somalia were announced, and the newly formulated Somalia National Development Plan was endorsed. The meeting also put in place mechanisms to monitor implementation on the ground of these initiatives, with a strict timetable to hold a Security Conference in October 2017 and a 'High Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) within six months and on a regular basis thereafter.' Somalia's leaders went to the London Conference with expectations for financial and security guarantees, and these were pledged in good faith and with high expectations that Somali politician would deliver this time around.

Optimism and well wishes aside, Somalia continues to face acute challenges that could easily undo the

current progress in political transition and in enhancing the 'federal arrangement.' These complex problems require thorough assessment, with the integrity to delve into the internal political machinations informing Somalia's political arrangements at the Federal Government and Federal Member States levels. In this regard, the realization of the recent National Security Architecture, in spite of its hasty conclusion just in time for the London Conference, assumes the utmost priority if Somalia is to make concrete progress. Obviously, its implementation will be facing tremendous challenges given the realities on the ground. The architecture is genuinely national as well as federal in essence. But the question is how it can be implemented given the realities that have been created over years, whereby clan militias have simultaneously been considered the Somali National Army and have received salaries and stipends under both titles from here and there. What happens if the new architecture forces them to demobilize, resulting in their huge financial loss? Will the militias let that happen in addition to the public encouragement related to disarmament recently promulgated over social media? Who disarms who; is there clarity on this? What mechanisms have been put forward to address resource redistribution questions between the



Federal Government and the FMS? Have they set up those mechanisms?

This is why the sustainability and the implementability of the agreement reached among Somalia's various leaders before the London Conference needs some scrutiny. Previous similar leadership agreements formulated for the sake of showing a unified face to the international community have faltered immediately following the completion of the conferences and ultimately failed to take effect. The most important question is whether this understanding between Somalia's leaders will face the same fate as previous understandings.

The other important issue is the relations between the Federal Government and the FMS. What are the implications of the Federal Government's lack of recognition of the relative autonomy of the FMS, which have their own militias and resources? To what extent will the federal government be sensitive to local realities and create accommodative structures, rather than try to impose its authority? These are some of the questions that have yet to be answered by Somalis themselves. Moreover, Somalis must look critically at accommodative modalities to ensure that consensus becomes the core of decision-making, to build the resilience of Somalia's communities. Given the kind of clan-

based federal arrangement in Somalia, with the Federal Member States playing key roles in the equation, there is a need to emphasize the 'federal' nature of the security apparatuses, as indicated in the National Security Architecture. The security structures of Somalia will be much more effective and efficient if a bottom-up approach in organizing the security structure is adopted, with, of course, a concrete mandate for the federal government. This likewise avoids the duplicity in Somalia's armed services that has put financial stress on donor funding.

In spite of the constitutional framework providing for a decentralized government structure, the federal government does not hold much sway in the country's federal arrangements. Rather the reverse has remained true. Federal Member States, except Hir-Shebelle, were created through local political dynamics. This reality dictates the need for sensitivity to harness the delicate power balance between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. Meaningful rapprochement and lasting trust between these political forces have yet to develop and be cemented. Evidently, Somalia's 'federalism,' encapsulated in its well-entrenched clan parlance, remains suspicious of any notion of centralism. In spite of an outward manifestation of solidarity, deep-rooted suspicions and political machinations to

overturn the power-balance have informed Somalia's political life in recent times. That is why centralism has been rejected in Somalia and it would be futile as well as a waste of effort to try to re-impose it. That is why genuine accommodative mechanisms with the necessary sensitivities should be sought. Eventually it is only the Somalis themselves who can determine the fate of their country. Somalis must look at each other's achievements and nurture them. Somalia's fate is determined by the engagements of the Somalis with each other, not against each other or undermining the achievements of the others. There should be trust and genuine readiness to listen to each other.

In this regard, the international community has reaffirmed that it will work with the existing institutions and Somalia's existing National Security Policy. The international community is also willing to work with both the Federal Member States and the Federal Government at the same time. The center should not try to dictate who engages with whom so long as the activities are premised on alleviating the challenges Somalis are facing with regard to drought and a humanitarian crisis and strengthening local capacity in the fight against Al-Shabaab. But there is a need for greater harmony between the center and the Federal Member

States if this effort is to continue unaffected.

In this context, critically examining realities in Somalia will lead us to scrutinize the efficacy of the new National Security Architecture and the implications of failure to implement it. Full implementation demands a critical political commitment from the leadership of Somalia, both local and national, and well coordinated financial and organizational support at both levels. But both of these critical determinants appear to be missing in Somalia.

There are growing tensions within the government, and reshuffling is being pursued to address these problems, even before the new cabinet members have settled into their jobs. Relations between the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government are also stressed following the decision of some 100-plus Members of Parliament to question the moves made by the executive internally and externally. This goes back to the elections—the struggle between winners and losers that may lead the government to gridlock. One has only to recollect the political machinations that propelled the existing leadership to power, the confused security policies (at the beginning there was the illusion of dialogue, but now the government is forced into a combative stance to fight

Al-Shabaab and the drought situation as well as questions related to AMISOM's role—the backbone of security in Somalia today) proposed by the winners in the first few months of their tenure, the growing tension within the executive and the planned reshuffle way before the cabinet settles down, possible rifts between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States in matters pertaining to power, security apparatus management and resource appropriation—all remain visible indicators of a challenging political arrangement. There is increasingly visible cooperation between Jubaland, Galmudug and Puntland as well as Jubaland and South West administrations in resource sharing and security cooperation, initiated by the administrations themselves. Can the Federal Government further enhance these schemes?

The provisions of the Somali National Security Architecture, therefore, need to be viewed along with these untenable realities on the ground. The architecture provides for the creation of a Somali National Army (SNA) comprising 18,000 troops, excluding the Special Forces (Danab), Air Force and Navy, as well as a 32,000-strong police force divided among the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. The distribution of the police force and how many of them should be Darawish has not yet been determined, although there is an

understanding that it should be equitably and fairly distributed. Apart from this, the architecture indicates that the "existing SNA sectors shall be redrawn to align with the Federal Member States boundaries to reflect the political developments in the country/federal system."

The architecture also outlines the hierarchy in the command and control of the top leadership in the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, with the President in charge. The National Security Council will provide strategic and policy guidance, while regional security councils will enforce implementation. A comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program is also planned. This is a critical challenge given that retirement has been forgotten for a long time.

But the most important part of the Architecture is the fact that the plan further enhances and cements the federal arrangement through a security mechanism. At the same time, the biggest disadvantage it presents is the lack of a mechanism to accommodate possible losers, especially in the capital city, in the implementation of the architecture. An omission in this regard has consequences for the survival of the government. Unless the government makes contingency plans to accommodate those soldiers in

Mogadishu that may be sidelined in this process, a disaster is in the offing.

Another serious challenge to the realization of the National Security Architecture is the lack of swift movement towards its implementation, and the possibility that it will garner more opposition from those it sidelines. As time passes, inaction in the implementation of the National Security Architecture poses increasing danger of further fragmentation and chaos. Equally crucial, by way of frustrating the realization of the security arrangement, is the negative portrayal of AMISOM during the campaign. Remarks made about Somalia's neighbors and AMISOM countervailed the imperatives that have necessitated the deployment of AMISOM and the crucial role of Somalia's neighbors, which was reaffirmed through the AU and UNSC mandates and approved by all international security partners and donor agencies. Those statements during the campaign also indicate the lack of awareness regarding the critical role AMISOM plays in the survival of the government. Everybody agrees that if AMISOM withdraws today, the resultant outcome is the obvious. In the absence of a meaningful Somali security apparatus, the task of preserving the federal government and thwarting Al-Shabaab's long-existing ambition to overrun Villa Somalia has remained the responsibility of this unique African peacekeeping

force, whose mandate could not be substituted with that of a traditional UN peacekeeping force. Putting this in place in Somalia has required immense human and material sacrifice. The current administration has recognized the facts, although belatedly and after serious damage to the credibility and crucial role of AMISOM, which has been felt on the ground. AMISOM's periodic mandate could easily be scrapped, and this would be a relief for most of the troop contributing countries. It would be Somalia, with no alternatives in place, that would be exposed to the threats it is ill-prepared to confront.

On the political front, IGAD states as well as the international community have invested tremendous amounts of time, human capital and resources in state-building efforts in Somalia. Hence, they have a large stake in the country's success. The sacrifices made by all stakeholders, and first and foremost the Somali people, require that Somalia prevails in its peace endeavors. The alternative comes at the cost of additional suffering and continued tensions in the sub-region.

## **CDRC monthly seminar hosts Dr. Walid Mussa**

CDRC, in collaboration with the Royal Danish Embassy, organized a public seminar on 31 May 2017 under the title "Somalia Now and the Way Forward." Government officials, representatives of the diplomatic corps and researchers from private and public institutions were in attendance. Dr. Walid Musa, Director at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), presented his brainstorming on recent developments, which led to a comprehensive discussion on events in Somalia, opportunities and challenges.

Dr. Walid expounded at some length on Somalia's turbulent past, explaining the current relative normalcy as it stands in stark contrast to the situation of the last few decades. Now, he indicated, visible progress can be observed at least in the capital, Mogadishu, where the people go about their daily routines relatively peacefully, facilities are improving, and the terrorist group Al-Shabaab is progressively marginalized. However, according to Dr. Walid, this state of relative normalcy in Somalia remains extremely fragile. Somalia's ever-present clan-fueled tensions, further exacerbated by the absence on the ground of a strong authority with the objective of creating an all-inclusive arrangement accommodative of the interests of all sections of the society,

threatens the current stability. In the absence of such an authority, extremist religious groups like Al-Shabaab flourish and the clan divide deepens. Even those political leaders with the best credentials to address these challenges have failed, mainly because of the priority they have given to their immediate tribal interests vis-à-vis the Somali national agenda of reconciliation. All of the peace processes have failed to spearhead an effective reconciliation between clans, and the rifts and rivalries continue to challenge Somalia today.

Further expounding on the current political situation in Somalia, particularly following the election of President Mohammed Farmajo, Dr. Walid stressed the need for cautious optimism. The fate of Somalia is hanging in the balance, with an equal chance of success and failure. He did not shy away from outlining the positive markers which ought to be capitalized on: a large number of Somalis joining the army; a political and demographic shift (with western educated politicians joining the state apparatus and the youth and women more active and vocal); the achievement of an elected parliament and the agreement among Somalia's political elite on the National Security Architecture. Nonetheless, he argued, the vital security architecture was formulated in record time, and just in time for the London Conference of 11 May 2017. A matter deserving the

utmost care and thoroughness was addressed with unusual ease, it seems, a fact that may actually endanger implementation of the accord.

In spite of the progress made so far, Dr. Walid underscored the need for careful scrutiny of challenges so as to make the current opportunities a reality. He noted that many of the new political elite, brought up in the West, may fail to understand the nuances of Somali politics on the ground and may buckle in the face of imminent challenges. The clan orientation of Somalia politics may also make the current leadership guests in Mogadishu, exposed to security risks associated with the local clan politics. If not carefully navigated, such strictly clan-based political dynamics in Somalia entail a serious risk of further fragmentation.

The financial factor is equally decisive in Somalia. Money laundering and well-entrenched corruption as well as the measures that could be taken to reverse this, have the potential to disrupt the existing political arrangements. To address combined economic worries and political challenges, Somalis need to work in a cohesive manner and the international community should reconsider its insistence on a possible scaling-down of financial assistance, which could lead to a political crisis and eventual fragmentation of the Somali state.

In the ensuing debate, there was a consensus that Somalia's political future hangs in the balance. In the general discussion, some basic elements were highlighted as potential factors in determining the future of the current political arrangements. Some of these included the readiness of the Somalis to assume full responsibility for resolving their problems vis-à-vis the piecemeal agenda that has so judiciously been forwarded by external elements; the practical application of the 'federal arrangement' in Somalia as provided for in the federal constitution and the political rights ascribed to the current federal regional states; and the level of implementation of the new security architecture within the context of the 'federal system.' The need for a Somalia Federal Army, with a common culture, was also emphasized. In the best interest of preserving the current federal arrangement, the reversal of which would be tantamount to unmaking the progress so far, serious consideration should be given to implementation of the security architecture in a manner that accommodates the interests of all the regional states. Likewise, it was repeatedly stated that Somali political elites as well as the international community should appreciate the sacrifices made and the achievements in maintaining peace and stability in Somalia as a result of the efforts of IGAD and AMISOM. Of course, in the medium and long-term, Somalia needs

to attain self-sufficiency, such that it is positioned financially and militarily to handle its own security concerns. The financial and political support rendered to Somalia by the international community should be geared towards enabling the former to achieve that goal. It was the express view of participants that Somalia would soon regain its rightful place, with a more positive role to play in the region, the continent and the world.

### **Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin addresses the International Gathering in Berlin**

Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, former Foreign Minister Of Ethiopia, current Ambassador of Ethiopia to the Peoples' Republic of China, and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC), addressed the 22<sup>nd</sup> International Berlin Gathering on 1 June 2017. Dignitaries and high-level government representatives, including the President of Madagascar, the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic and parliamentarians from 50 countries, participated in the International Gathering. The following is the statement Amb. Seyoum delivered.

*His Excellency the Chairman of the Social Democrats Faction in Bundestag,  
His Excellency Chairman of the Christian Democrats,  
Excellencies,*

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

*It is a great honor to attend such an auspicious event as the annual International Gathering in Berlin organized by the Bundestag. I wish also to extend my respect and gratitude to the organizers of this event, H.E. the President of the Bundestag Professor Norbert Lammert and the members of the task force that have made this gathering possible. In particular, I would like to mention my old friend and a good friend of Africa, a great humanist, Rudolf Decker, who with his tireless efforts has accomplished so much in the course of his public and international service, bringing people of diverse political orientations, interest and cultures together, all working for peace and understanding in this challenging world. At any time and place has he ever failed to remind all of us that we have responsibilities before God?*

*For me in particular, as a person who has long engaged with Europe and its institutions, it is always a pleasure to be back in Berlin—the home of great intellectuals and a major political powerhouse in Europe, and indeed the cultural and economic capital of this continent. I have spent most of my life on college campuses, in liberation struggle for the attainment of democracy and change, in diplomacy and mediation, always benefiting from my experiences with Germany.*

*As a young man in my early thirties, I came to Berlin as part of my first trip to some European cities in 1982. My host took me for a tour around the city, West Berlin at the*

*time, and I visited some historic sites including the then Reichstag building now the home of the Bundestag, and the wall that divided Berlin into east and west. At the east side of the Reichstag we saw a big group of tourists busy writing their souvenirs on the wall. My host suggested that we too should join them and put our names, where we came from and the date, which we did. To my right side there was a senior man, probably in his seventies, who came with a black marker and wrote a sentence that attracted our attention, we went closer to him and read: "History divided this city and its people into two, but some day they will come together reunited by history, and a name (which I do not remember), Kolkata, India, July 1982."*

*Seven years later, Germans on both sides of the wall made history. Germany and the Germans have been reunited and they are busy building their new nation, bringing it to new heights. I hope that the old man lived to witness the fulfillment of his prediction. For me, and for Ethiopia, therefore, Berlin represents an important pillar in the bridge we are building between peoples of Europe, Africa and the rest of the world. Africa is a natural extension of Europe and vice versa. Within this larger neighborhood, Germany is the mainstay in Europe-Africa relations. Given its huge economy and the linkages it has created globally, it has borne the great responsibility of nurturing these relations.*

*I am therefore happy to share this moment with German and other European friends who have been on the side of Africa and indeed remain supportive of Africa*

*including my country, Ethiopia, in its tooth-and-nail struggle to defeat its number one, number two, number three enemy—poverty, as well as for the attainment of sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity.*

*Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,*

*In my personal capacity, I wish to make brief remarks today on three issues that I consider important.*

*First, I will focus on the need for a two-way paradigm shift in shaping the relations between Europe and Africa; secondly, on the importance of a strong and sustainable European Union for the newly emerging multi-polar world order, including for Africa; and finally, on the importance of further strengthening EU and its member states' cooperation and support to the Horn of Africa to sustain achievements made thus far as well as to ward off a relapse into conflict through helping South Sudan address the current crisis, and for Somalia to make progress.*

*The first issue is the need for a paradigm shift in Europe-Africa relations. Why am I suggesting this? There are a few points to mention to explain the problem. Relations between Europe and Africa are preoccupied with the history of the two continents, with the colonial past, and with the donor-recipient structural connections that have been institutionalized through ACP-EU countries agreement, Cotonou Agreement and Africa-EU Strategic Dialogue, all characterized by Paternalism, Conditionality, Selectivity and Coercion.*



*They seek to address symptoms of deep rooted socio-economic and political problems, such as short-term challenges of elections, quick-fix solutions to conflicts, issues of migration and so on and so forth. The relationship is not rooted in the basic premises that call for radical changes and transformation. Both Africa and Europe should go back to the basics.*

*We in Africa can no longer hide behind blaming the colonial legacy for our lack of good governance of the politics and the economy of our respective countries. We can no longer continue to abdicate our responsibility to be self-reliant, build institutions of good governance and respect for basic human rights of our citizens. Our continent is endowed with immense resources, natural and human. We have to identify our basic problems as to why we have failed in realizing the necessary transformation. We have to have clear understanding of our roles individually and collectively within the continent and make a paradigm shift to realize our dream for a peaceful, united and prosperous Africa. Within this framework, we have also to re-define and re-structure our relationship with European partners and others for the attainment of our common goals on a win-win basis.*

*On the European side too, there is an urgent need for a paradigm shift with regard to its relations with Africa. Their Conditionalities sought to promote democracy, good governance and human rights, and though valid, they cannot be imposed on Africa or supplanted from outside. The political,*

*economic, social, cultural basis must be created at home. Social strata that uphold and defend these values and their respective interests must grow and be nurtured by Africans themselves, without which the required development cannot be attained. What has thus far transpired since the 1960s, however, has only been circling the wagons, and remained a failure. Money cannot buy everything. Transforming Africa into a global growth pole therefore, requires a paradigm shift on the part of the partners as well. A new dialogue between Africa and Europe must start without delay. Lessons can be learned both from the opportunities and challenges of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.*

*Second: I wish to highlight the importance of the unity and sustainability of the European Union and its meaning for the emerging new world order. The present global developments have transpired to be more complicated, complex and full of uncertainties. The reality is that no one center can bring change that would address the challenges. There is a newly and fast emerging multi-polar world order. This requires inclusive and intensive consultations to create understanding and strengthen cooperation. This is key to achieving success in addressing the challenges that would help in building sustainable peace and shared prosperity for the global community.*

*With this backdrop, you would agree with me that a strong and sustainable European Union is a necessity now more than at any time. The European Union is the most*

*advanced union of sovereign independent states in human history. It has created institutions that integrated the member states through a common political system, harmonization of economic and trade activities, security, financial policies and laws that brought them immense prosperity and growing influence at the global level. This has not been achieved without challenges, and, to prevent relapse into the past and to move forward in building a common future for all, it requires building the Union through inclusive consultation and cooperation among Europeans themselves and beyond.*

*This leads to my third point. Going back to the need to continue engaging the Horn of Africa, Europe in general and Germany in particular have continuously supported the Horn's efforts to achieve peace and stability. You have engaged in supporting the peace efforts in Somalia and South Sudan. And, although developments in South Sudan and Somalia remain challenges, the close partnerships and infrastructure-based integration in the Horn inspire much optimism. This progress should be built upon and further enhanced, as this may be the basis of the region's transformation, making the symptoms of underdevelopment and poverty easier to address, in a systemic way.*

*I have great hope for the future in both continents, Africa and Europe, and I cannot think of a more important or a more appropriate forum for Europe and Africa to express our common aspirations for peace and development than this International*

*Gathering, where we are called upon to exchange ideas that will help us move forward in addressing inequality and the challenges of social mobility, peace and development for a common future.*

*I thank you!*